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BOOK REVIEWS
These dire predictions, we believe, are quite unfounded. Government regulation of economic enterprise, it is true, is likely to increase
in modern industrial society, notwithstanding our unshaken faith in
the ideal of maximum voluntaryism, just as more regulation is needed
for city automobile traffic than for driving buggies on country lanes.
And of such regulations labor relations will receive the greater share
the less capable-subjectively and objectively-the bargaining parties
are to do the right and wise thing by the community as well as by
themselves. 24 The forms which such government intervention assumes will vary with the nature of the problems to be solved, with the
institutional set-up, and with the traditions of the communities. The
criterion for their appraisal, however, should be merely their fairness,
practicability, and effectiveness, not the exact place in the economy where
they are applied.
Moreover, there seems nothing inevitable about the "course" which
a government such as ours may enter upon. Far from being bound to
stay on any set course, a democratic gqvernment is-in the language of
Cybernetics25-a highly sensitive "feedback" system, perpetually readjusting its course by way of reacting to the effects of its previous actions.
Where particular regulations of the terms of agreements are found
impractical and unsound they can easily be altered or withdrawn and
replaced by other methods. Hence, no great point of principle seems
indeed involved in this issue of "government regulation of the terms
of agreements."
JOHN V.
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In few fields is the practitioner so well served as he now is, with
the publicati6n of these two books, in the field of the jurisdiction and
practice of the United States Supreme Court.
Mr. Stern and Mr. Gressman have written an extraordinarily
concise handbook -a tour de force of condensation, actually containing only 353 pages of text' in large print on small pages. 2 Mr. Wolfson
and Mr. Kurland have performed the valuable service of bringing
Robertson and Kirkham's standard treatise up to date. This admirable
work is now restored to usefulness, with the structure and much of the
content of the 6riginal retained, but with appropriate additions and deletions to reflect the substantial changes of the intervening decade and a
half.
Both are practitioner's books. Mr. Stern and Mr. Gressman picture
the practitioner as wanting concrete answers to practical problems, and
they get right down to earth in giving them to him. Almost literally,
they take him by the hand as he enters the Supreme Court building,
and tell him which way to turn to reach the Clerk's office and which
way to the Marshal's office, how to get seats in the courtroom for
his family and friends, and how and when to snatch a bite to eat
before his case is called. These are simply spots of color in an equally
concrete treatment of countless more important matters. Judge Fahy
of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, reviewing this
book, found it "beyond criticism."3 This offers a tempting challenge to
later reviewers but one which in fairness sfiould be resisted.
The shortcomings of a summary, of course, are most obvious in
the treatment of technical requirements of jurisdiction. But good
lawyers, understand that summaries are only summaries and will be
grateful for the excellence of this one. Remarkably, this handbook
achieves a broader coverage than the Wolfson-Kurland treatise; it deals,
as the latter does not, with the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court and, even more usefully, with the extraordinary writs. Indeed,
the less technical sections of the book do not even have a summary's
shortcomings. The full discussion (45 pages) of criteria in the grant
of certiorari stands perfectly. well on its own. So, in particular, does the

1. The remainder of the book consists of a section of very helpful forms along
with the pertinent rules and statutes.
2. The field seems to invite such tours de force. Compare BUNN, A BRIEF SURVEY
OF THE JURISDIcTION AND PRAcricE OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES (5th ed. 1949),
dealing with the entire federal judicial system in 276 pages of text in even larger type on
even smaller pages..
3. Book Review, 64 HARv. L. REv. 1400 (1951).
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section on preparing a petition for certiorari (22 pages), and the two
chapters on briefs (27 pages) and oral argument (23 pages). Many
law schools might well consider discarding their present handbooks for
students taking part in moot appellate arguments and simply assigning
these last two chapters.
Mr. Wolfson and Mr. Kurland have a different and, it seems to
me, less valid conception of what a practitioner wants. They undertake
to deal thoroughly with the case law. But they assume that what is
called for, in such a treatment, is primarily the accurate statement of
rules and of the facts and holdings of illustrative cases. "We have forborne," they say in the preface, "to express our own opinions regarding
and the text
the wisdom of the Court's jurisdiction as now constituted ;,,4
makes clear that this means forbearing to express opinions concerning the
soundness of the Court's decisions on its jurisdiction and practice.
What a practitioner really wants, no doubt, is not for a professor to
say. But I am sure that this is not what students want-at least not good
students. An accurate collection and statement of relevant decisions is
helpful, of course, as a foundation for research. But if a book stops here
it does no more than improve on the arrangement and scholarship of the
United States Code Annotated. It helps only in getting the easy answers.
To work out hard answers, what you want is a book which deals with the
reasons for rules-with the materials of thought and argument. You
want a persistent'search for the rationale of statutory provisions, court
rules and judicial decisions alike, and persistent effort to lay bare competing considerations. You want an author who is doing this under his own
horsepower and not merely by quotation or paraphrase of judicial
opinions. Such an author will not shrink from disclosing his own judgments. Witness Wigmore. I cannot help believing that practitioners,
like students, prefer Wigmorean armories of rational thought concerning
difficult problems to mere collections, however well-organized, of holdings
and rules.
Fortunately, Mr. Wolfson and Mr. Kurland have not entirely succeeded in living up to the sterile positivism of their preface. Their book
contains a lot of analysis and criticism, and this is responsible for a lot of

4. In this, the authors claim to be following the example of their predecessors and
the advice of the survivor of them. But Robertson and Kirkham said in their preface
that, while their "major effort" had been "to state the rules as they exist and are
applied," they had "not refrained from criticism of established rules or of particular
decisions, where deemed to be justified." Nor did they so refrain from criticism of
critics of particular decisions. Many of their vigorous opinions have been edited out
of this edition, and the book loses force and color correspondingly.
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its value. But one can never wholly escape the shackles he puts on his
own purpose. The disappointments and limitations of this book seem
to me to trace directly to what its authors did not try to do.
Here is an example of what is likely to happen if one decides not
to think and speak for himself. With his attention fixed on the effort
simply to state what the cases seem to hold, anyone might well say,
as this book does, that:
Where the meaning
incorporated by it,
preting federal law,
Court and is not a

of a state statute depends upon federal law,
a construction of that state statute, interpresents a federal question for the Supreme
state ground of decision. 5

Standard Oil Co. v. Johnsor6 and the other cases which the authors
cite seem to support the statement. But one who is thinking critically
about the decisions and the problems with which they deal will see that
so unqualified a statement cannot possibly be true. Surely, a state cannot, by simply adopting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, make
questions of construction of those rules arising in state court proceedings
a matter for review in the Supreme Court of the United States. Wrestling with the question of where to draw the line, such an author would
at least decide that the Standard Oil case should be viewed with caution,
and he might even dai'e to suggest that it is unsound. This is only a
single instance, but it is not, I think, untypical nor is it trivial. Problems of state reference to federal law (like the converse problems of
federal reference to state law) present fascinating intellectual difficulties
and are of growing practical importance. This book barely gets to first
base in helping a lawyer confronted with such a problem.
To give another illustration, the authors are concerned with the
"contradictions" in the decisions respecting the effect of a state court's
certificate that a federal question was raised and decided, 7 and particularly with Honeyman v. Hanan.8 Searching for a rule, they pose the
question whether such a certificate is or is not "sufficient to show the
existence of a federal question," and they find the answer unclear. A
search for the reason for rules, it is submitted, would point the way out
of the difficulty. If the problem is simply one of finding out whether,
as a matter of fact, a particular and definite federal question was or
was not raised and decided, there seems to be no reason why the Supreme
5. Section 99, p. 180.
6. 316 U.S. 481 (1942).
7. Section 81, pp. 138-41. While preparing the "book, the authors enlarged on their
difficulties with this problem in Wolfson and Kurland, Certificates by States Courts of
the Existence of a Federal Question, 63 HAav. L. REv. 111 (1949).

8. 300 U.S. 14 (1937).
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Court should not accept the state court's word for it, even though the
record is otherwise wholly silent. The Supreme Court seems willing to
do this; certainly Honeyman v. Hanan is not to the contrary. But the
Court may need to know more. It may be uncertain exactly what the
question is which was raised and decided, and which the Court is now
called upon to review. This was the situation in the Honeyman case.
The Court accordingly could not rest upon the certificate, and remanded
the case to the state court for clarification. On the return from the
remand, this procedure was vindicated, when it was disclosed that the
question actually raised and decided was insubstantial, and that another
more serious question which had at first seemed to be involved was not
actually in the case.0
One of the most useful parts of the Wolfson-Kurland book is the
elaborate examination of the "principles and precedents governing the
exercise" of discretion to grant certiorari. 10 There is no more conspicuous feature of the Court's jurisdiction, either in principle, or practice, than this enormous power it has to decide what cases to decide. The
Wolfson-Kurland discussion, coupled with Stern and Gressman's, helps
to throw more light where more light is badly needed. Yet here again
it seems to me that a more critical inquiry, conducted in a mood of
greater readiness to assume intellectual responsibility for firm conclusions, would have yielded better returns. The authors, for example,
fudge the question whether, in the absence either of a square conflict of
decision or of an issue of wide public importance, the Court will or
should grant certiorari simply to correct a plain error of decision.
Robertson and Kirkham had argued forthrightly that the Court both
would and should do this in certain cases, and had suggested as criteria
the plainness of the error and its unambiguous appearance on the face
of the opinion below."' The suggestion was worth pursuit and
vigorous debate instead of weak dilution.' 2 The pursuit would have
provided material for coming to grips with, instead of straddling,
the further and related problem of cases in which the ascertainment of
error involves the appraisal of controverted evidence and findings of
fact. In federal employers' liability cases and cases involving the application of constitutional guarantees of fair trial, this problem has been
a battleground in recent years. This book tells the practitioner that
9. Honeyman v. Hanan, 302 U.S. 375 (1937). Curiously, neither in the treatise nor
in their article, supra note 7, do the authors make any reference to this illuminating
denouement.

10. Part 4, §§ 308-375, pp. 579-753.
11. Section 304 (lst ed. 1936).
12. Section 334.
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there have been battles, 13 but by failing to get into the fight on its own
account, it fails to give him any new or better weapons against the
inevitable recurrence of the fray.
To repeat, this is a good book but a little intellectual nerve would
have made it better.
HENRY M. HART, JR.f
EFFECTS OF TAXATION ON CORPORATE MERGERS.
By J. Keith
Butters,* John Lintner,** and William L. Cary.*** Boston: Division
of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard
University. 1951. Pp. xviii, 364. $4.25.

The contribution of Messrs. Butters, Lintner, and Cary, although
perhaps not based on unassailable scientific methods, persuavisely challenges several heretofore widely held conceptions regarding corporate
mergers. The object of this study was to provide "a careful dnd dispassionate appraisal of the effects of Federal taxation on merger activities and on the continued existence as competitive entities of our independently owned small and medium-size companies."
The authors conducted extensive field interviews with one or more
participants in over 100 sales and purchases of business enterprises
which occurred during the period 1940 through 1947. Directly considered
were the 1,990 mergers uncovered through the field surveys and through
analysis of general statistics reported in the various financial journals.
This painstaking research and analysis indicates that although tax
burdens have been a highly significant motivation in the sale of a considerable number of closely held companies, the role of taxes has been
much more limited than frequently supposed. Indeed, it was determined
that federal taxation was important in but 9.7o of all corporate mergers
involving 27.5% of the total corporate assets included in the survey.
The disproportionate amount of assets involved is attributed to the
fact that tax motivations were more significant in connection with the
merger of the larger closely held companies. Furthermore, the merger
movement did not appear to weaken the over-all competitive structure
of the economy to any serious degree. The ultimate conclusion, therefore, was that during the 1940's tax pressures on owners of closely held
companies did not cause independently owned companies to be sold out
13. Sections 304 and 373-74.
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